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Abstract 
  
Twenty two years after the collapse of the Somalian government, a functioning nation state has 
yet to appear in the east African country. Attempts were made early on by the United Nations to 
end suffering and restore order to the chaotic environment, but these attempts failed to produce 
lasting effects. This paper discusses the sociopolitical conditions within Somalia, the inability of 
outside actors to operate in the complex environment, and the lack of political will in the United 
States to continue the humanitarian mission after setbacks as well as the effect these conditions 
had on the overall failure that occurred. By compiling several articles that have attempted to 
explain the failure of the first post-Cold War intervention attempt, as well as survey statistics 
and news articles, this project synthesizes components of several arguments into three 
significant explanations. The first argument presented is that the family based social structure of 
Somalia was too complex an environment for the western powers to operate in, thus the 
attempts to enforce a western idea of order was failed from its onset. The second argument is 
that the military and humanitarian forces deployed into Somalia failed to cooperatively function 
in a way that would have led to a successful mission. The third and final argument this work 
postulates is the effect political opinion in the US had on the continuation of attempted aid 
operations as certain events, particularly the October 3, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, unfolded in 
Somalia. As current and future historians look back on the crisis state that is Somalia, the two 
decade period of statelessness will be its hallmark. Had the US led attempts by the United 
Nations proved successful, a vastly different history may have been written in Somalia as well 
as other African nations that experienced great periods of suffering in the last two decades. 
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Academic journal articles were the majority of sources cited in this paper for a few reasons. The 
first reason is that there are not many books that attempt to shed light on the operations of the 
United Nations in Somalia over the entire course of the intervention attempt. Because most of the 
events in question occurred within a small time frame approximately twenty years ago and 
possibly because of the confusing nature of the situation, few over-arching and in-depth attempts 
have been made by scholars to discern what went wrong in Somalia. At first this seemed 
detrimental to my research. However, the plurality of viewpoints on the matter provided several 
possible answers to why intervention failed. Also, connecting the dots in the similarities between 
those viewpoints created a sense of understanding and provided me with helpful background 
knowledge as well as a well-supported thesis. 
 
 
